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INTRODUCTION
Jose Padilla, a Honduran national but a forty-year permanent resident
of the United States, pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana in the state
of Kentucky.1 Under United States law, almost all drug-related offenses,
including marijuana possession, render non-United States citizens who
commit them “deportable.”2 However, Padilla’s attorney, who advised him
to plead guilty, did not inform him of the risk of deportation.3 Instead, he
incorrectly advised Padilla that he “did not have to worry about
immigration status since he had been in the country so long.”4
Six days after entry of judgment, Padilla’s correctional facility notified
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that it had lodged a
detainer against Padilla as a precursor to deportation.5 He then filed a
motion for postconviction relief in which he alleged that his attorney
1

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010).
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (rendering “deportable” any alien who is convicted of a
violation of any law or regulation—state, federal, or foreign—relating to a controlled substance, with the
exception of “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of
marijuana”).
3
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
4
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
5
Brief for Petitioner at 10 n.3, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1497552, at *10
n.3.
2
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provided ineffective assistance of counsel.6 Following conflicting decisions
at the trial and appellate levels—the trial court denying postconviction relief
and the appellate court granting it—the Kentucky Supreme Court denied
Padilla’s motion.7 The court found that the possibility of deportation was a
collateral consequence8 of a guilty plea and held that neither affirmative
misadvice about nor failure to advise of a collateral consequence constituted
a violation of a person’s Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.10 The
Court held that “constitutionally competent counsel would have advised
[Padilla] that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to
automatic deportation.”11 Since Padilla’s counsel failed to so advise him,
Padilla would, on remand, be able to argue that his attorney had been
ineffective.12
Some commentators have called the Padilla decision a boon for both
criminal defendants and the criminal defense bar.13 To some extent, it was:
the decision was certainly favorable to Jose Padilla himself, and the
requirement that criminal defense lawyers learn the basics of immigration
law in order to provide “Padilla warnings”14 to their clients might similarly
assist other noncitizen criminal defendants. As a result of the decision,
those defendants—if they did not receive Padilla warnings—may be able to
obtain postconviction relief in the form of withdrawn guilty pleas, new
trials, or both.

6

Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
Id. at 485.
8
A collateral consequence is one that is not a “definite, immediate, and largely automatic” result of
a criminal conviction. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 620 (2008).
9
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485 (“As collateral consequences are outside the scope
of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it follows that counsel’s failure to advise
Appellee of such collateral issue or his act of advising Appellee incorrectly provides no basis for
relief.”).
10
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
11
Id.
12
Id. Padilla would still have to show that he was prejudiced by this ineffective assistance, an issue
the Supreme Court declined to reach. Note also that Padilla’s attorney affirmatively provided him with
inaccurate advice rather than merely failing to adequately advise him. The Court dismissed this
distinction. Id. at 1484 (“A holding limited to affirmative misadvice would invite . . . absurd results.”).
However, the Court’s failure to distinguish between affirmative misadvice and failure to advise arguably
renders the holding unnecessarily broad insofar as it applies to failure-to-advise situations, which will be
discussed later in this Note. See infra Part II.A.
13
See, e.g., Eric T. Berkman, Case on Collateral Attacks Could Empower Defense Bar, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., Oct. 26, 2009, at 1.
14
This phrase was coined by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Padilla. See Padilla, 130 S.
Ct. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although it does not seem to have been adopted yet by federal courts
applying Padilla, it is used in this Note to refer to the warnings of potential immigration consequences
(or other collateral consequences) that attorneys are required to give their clients after Padilla.
7
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This Note argues that while the decision in Padilla was a win for Jose
Padilla and similarly situated noncitizen criminal defendants, it poses
significant problems for criminal defendants, their lawyers, and the entire
criminal justice system. The majority’s opinion purported to limit itself to
immigration consequences15 and it justified that limitation by pointing to the
“severity” of deportation.16 However, guilty pleas can have innumerable
collateral consequences other than deportation, and their relative severities
are in the eye of the beholder.17 For this reason, Justice Scalia, in dissent,
expressed an ominous concern that there was “no logical stopping-point”
between requiring Padilla warnings for immigration and requiring such
warnings for other—or even all—collateral consequences.18
Mere months after the Padilla decision was handed down, Justice
Scalia’s fear was shown prescient as federal courts began to expand Padilla
to apply to nondeportation collateral consequences. In September 2010, in
Bauder v. Department of Corrections,19 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld an ineffectiveness claim in a case in which an attorney
provided inaccurate advice about the possibility of civil confinement.20 This
decision could be an anomaly, but it could just as easily be the first in a
series of decisions extending Padilla. Some legal scholars argued, even
before Padilla was decided, that attorneys should have to warn their clients
of the collateral consequences of guilty pleas.21 While Padilla and Bauder
may be the first steps in granting that wish, requiring warnings for all
collateral consequences of guilty pleas will give rise to unintended and
undesirable consequences.
Although the extension of Padilla to more (or all) collateral
consequences of guilty pleas would theoretically raise the standard of
attorney effectiveness and thus benefit criminal defendants, the reality is
that the costs of extension will likely outweigh the benefits. Requiring
Padilla warnings for every collateral consequence will, in fact, have the
exact opposite effect from the one that is intended: it will make the
provision of effective assistance prohibitively costly. If Padilla warnings
15
See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (“[W]e now hold that counsel must inform her client whether his
plea carries a risk of deportation.”).
16
Id. (“The severity of deportation—‘the equivalent of banishment or exile[]’—only underscores
how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.” (quoting
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947)) (citation omitted)).
17
For instance, reasonable people could differ as to whether being forced to return to one’s country
of citizenship is more severe than being subjected to indefinite civil confinement.
18
Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19
619 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
20
Id. at 1273, 1275.
21
See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697 (2002); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively
Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 119 (2009).
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are ultimately required for all collateral consequences of a guilty plea,
criminal lawyers will have a difficult time effectively assisting any of their
clients.
The remainder of this Note proceeds as follows. Part I briefly provides
a general background on ineffective assistance of counsel and describes the
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel that prevailed prior to Padilla.
Part II describes the effect of the Padilla decision on ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. More specifically, Part II examines the narrow effect that
the majority expected the case to have. Part III discusses the concern voiced
by Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Padilla and discusses the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Bauder, which may very well be the first in a series of
circuit court decisions that bear out Justice Scalia’s fears. Part IV discusses
the practical problems that will attend the expansion of Padilla to collateral
consequences other than deportation. Part V recommends that courts
interpret Padilla narrowly to prevent its expansion.
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GENERALLY
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for
his defense.”22 This guarantee does more than merely protect a criminal
defendant’s right to hire counsel.23 In 1938, the Supreme Court interpreted
the Sixth Amendment to require that a criminal defendant could not be
convicted unless he was represented by counsel or waived his right to
representation, effectively guaranteeing that federal criminal defendants
who could not afford a lawyer would be provided one.24 In 1963, the Court
expanded the guarantee of counsel at government expense to indigent
criminal defendants in state courts.25
The Supreme Court further expanded its reading of the Sixth
Amendment’s assistance of counsel guarantee in McMann v. Richardson,26
holding that “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel.”27 Thus, the Court wrote in the landmark case Strickland v.
Washington28 that it is not sufficient “[t]hat a person who happens to be a
lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused.”29 Rather, “[a]n accused is
22

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
This was not always the case. Courts formerly interpreted the Sixth Amendment to guarantee
merely the right to procure counsel if a defendant chose and could afford to do so. See United States v.
Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891) (“There is . . . no general obligation on the part of the
government . . . [to] retain counsel for defendants or prisoners.”).
24
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938).
25
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
26
397 U.S. 759 (1970).
27
Id. at 771 n.14 (emphasis added) (citing cases).
28
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
29
Id. at 685.
23
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entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who
plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.”30 To determine
whether an attorney has been effective, federal courts use the two-pronged
test that the Supreme Court established in Strickland. The first question is
whether a criminal defendant’s attorney rendered counsel that was
“deficient.”31 If a defendant received constitutionally deficient counsel,
courts move on to the second prong and consider whether the defendant
was “prejudiced” by the deficient performance.32 The two parts of the
Strickland test are discussed in turn.
In order to satisfy the first prong and show that an attorney provided
constitutionally deficient assistance, a criminal defendant must demonstrate
that his attorney’s performance fell below an “objective standard of
reasonableness.”33 The Strickland Court, declining to define the standard by
reference to particular conduct, wrote that “[t]he proper measure of attorney
performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms.”34 As benchmarks of reasonableness, the Court suggested
“[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association
standards and the like.”35
If a criminal defendant’s attorney fails to render performance
consistent with prevailing professional norms and thus does not meet the
objective standard of reasonableness, courts move on to the second inquiry:
whether the ineffective assistance prejudiced the defense.36 In order to show
prejudice, a defendant must show that his attorney’s deficient performance
had an “adverse effect” on his defense.37 More specifically, a defendant
asserting an ineffective assistance claim “must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”38
The defendant in Strickland claimed that he had received ineffective
assistance in a capital sentencing proceeding, but the Court declined to
30

Id.
Id. at 687 (“This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”).
32
Id. (“This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”).
33
Id. at 687–88. Courts presume that counsel acted reasonably, so the onus is on the defendant to
satisfy the first prong. Id. at 690 (“[T]he court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to
have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment.”).
34
Id. at 688 (“More specific guidelines are not appropriate.”).
35
Id. Note that the court did not go so far as to say that reasonableness and compliance with
professional norms are the same thing—such norms are “only guides.” Id.
36
Id. at 693.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 694. The Court went on to define “reasonable probability” as “a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
31
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distinguish between such a proceeding and a typical trial.39 And in Hill v.
Lockhart,40 the Court further expanded Strickland by applying it to the plea
process.41 In that case, the Court explained that in applying the Strickland
test to the plea process, courts should leave the first prong unchanged but
interpret the second prong to require a criminal defendant contesting a plea
to show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.”42
The decision in Hill expanded Strickland’s reach considerably.
Roughly 95% of all criminal convictions result from guilty pleas rather than
trials.43 Thus, at its advent, the Strickland test was the standard for
ineffective assistance claims asserted by perhaps 5% of all convicts. After
Hill, the other 95% of convicted criminal defendants would also have to
meet the Strickland standard in order to show ineffective assistance.44
II. THE EFFECT OF PADILLA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
The Padilla Court held that in order to meet the Strickland test’s
“objective standard of reasonableness,” an attorney must apprise his
noncitizen criminal defendant client of the possibility of deportation as a
collateral consequence of a guilty plea.45 The Court remanded to the
Kentucky Supreme Court for consideration of the prejudice question in
light of this new rule.46
In the most straightforward sense, Padilla may not mark a particularly
significant departure from the Court’s ineffective assistance of counsel
jurisprudence. Justice Stevens’s opinion for the majority makes clear that
the Court was simply applying the Strickland test to a guilty plea as Hill
requires.47 Thus, in the narrowest terms, the Court was merely following
Strickland and finding that in the particular circumstances before it,
Padilla’s attorney had failed to meet the requisite objective standard of
reasonableness.

39

Id. at 686–87.
474 U.S. 52 (1985).
41
See id. at 58 (“We hold . . . that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges
to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
42
Id. at 59.
43
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 n.13 (2010) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 418 tbl.5.17, 450
tbl.5.46 (2005) [hereinafter DOJ SOURCEBOOK]).
44
Note that these numbers are potentially inaccurate (but are nevertheless illustrative) because the
95% figure cited in Padilla was based on statistics from 2000 and 2001, and the decision in Hill was
handed down fifteen years earlier. See DOJ SOURCEBOOK, supra note 43.
45
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
46
Id. at 1487.
47
Id. at 1485 n.12 (“Whether Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim follows from Hill . . . .”).
40
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But Padilla did more than this. The Court may have been applying the
Strickland test to the facts before it, but it was also creating a rule for courts
to follow in the future. The Padilla opinion and the rule it established suffer
from three shortcomings that are further discussed in this Part: (1) the rule
is broader than the facts of Padilla demanded, creating ambiguity about
how to apply Padilla in future cases, (2) the opinion established a brightline rule (which is unusual in this area of law), and (3) lower federal courts
will disagree as to whether and how to apply the Padilla rule retroactively.
A. Padilla’s Two Possible Rules

The reach of the rule the Court announced in Padilla will depend on
whether courts opt to follow the holding as set forth by the majority or
interpret the case more narrowly. The majority’s stated rule could be read as
dictum because Padilla’s attorney did not simply fail to inform him that he
would be deported as a result of his plea deal. Rather, the attorney
affirmatively told Padilla that he would not be deported.48 Thus, any portion
of the opinion that would require defense attorneys to affirmatively provide
warnings about deportation, instead of simply requiring them not to
misinform their clients about deportation risks, was unnecessarily broad.
As a result of the opinion’s broad language, there are two different
ways in which future courts might apply Padilla. The narrower possible
rule is that if a criminal defendant’s attorney incorrectly advises him that
his guilty plea will not cause him to be deported, that misadvice constitutes
deficient performance. The broader possible rule, the one that the Court
said it was imposing,49 is that attorneys must warn their noncitizen criminal
defendant clients of the immigration consequences that may attend a guilty
plea.
B. Padilla as a Bright-Line Rule50

The Padilla decision creates a bright-line rule by establishing an entire
category of cases that, regardless of the specific circumstances of each
individual case, constitute per se deficient performance of counsel. The
creation of such a rule is an anomaly among the cases following Strickland.
The Court in Strickland explicitly refused to set out specific guidelines to
define reasonableness.51 In later cases applying Strickland, the Court has
continuously rejected per se rules that obviated the need to examine the
48

Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1486.
50
The Court sets out its holding in Padilla as if it is a bright-line rule: “[W]e now hold that counsel
must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.” Id. Accordingly, this Note assumes
that the Court did, in fact, mean to establish such a rule.
51
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (instructing courts to consider the specific
facts of each case and decide “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the
circumstances”).
49
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specific facts of a case to consider whether counsel acted reasonably.52 In
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the Court reversed, as inconsistent with Strickland, a
number of decisions that had created a per se rule requiring counsel to file a
notice of appeal unless specifically instructed by their clients not to.53 The
Court reasoned that Strickland required a “circumstance-specific
reasonableness inquiry” and that, therefore, the affirmative obligation that
the lower courts had imposed could not hold up.54 But the Padilla Court has
now established the very type of bright-line rule—one imposing an
affirmative obligation on counsel—that it previously struck down in FloresOrtega.
C. Retroactivity

There is not yet a general consensus as to whether Padilla applies
retroactively.55 Some courts have applied Padilla retroactively,56 while
others have declined to do so.57
The landmark Supreme Court retroactivity case, and the starting point
for questions of retroactivity, is Teague v. Lane.58 In that case, the Court
held that as a general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure do
not apply retroactively to cases that are already final.59 Under Teague, the
question is whether Padilla created a “new constitutional rule of criminal
procedure.”60 A California court considering the retroactivity of Padilla
(and finding it retroactive) explained: “When the Supreme Court applies a
well-established rule of law in a new way based on the specific facts of a
particular case, it does not generally establish a new rule.”61 There is no
question that the Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel standard is a
52

See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478 (2000) (“We reject this per se rule as inconsistent
with Strickland’s holding . . . . The Court of Appeals failed to engage in the circumstance-specific
reasonableness inquiry required by Strickland, and that alone mandates vacatur and remand.”).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
In other words, it is not clear whether Padilla would be applicable to cases in which direct review
(trial and noncollateral-review appeals) had already concluded at the time it was handed down.
56
See, e.g., United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 640–41 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that Padilla did
not announce a new rule, but rather that it applied the rule from Strickland to new facts, such that it was
retroactively applicable).
57
See, e.g., Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that Padilla
announced a new rule and was not subject to either of the exceptions from Teague that would render it
retroactively applicable).
58
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
59
Id. at 310 (“Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules
are announced.”). “Final,” in this context, means that direct appeals have been exhausted.
60
Id. at 316.
61
United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010)
(citing Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1992); Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872, 885 (4th Cir.
1994)).
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“well-established rule of law,” so the turning point for courts deciding
Padilla’s retroactivity is the question whether the Padilla Court was merely
applying Strickland or was creating a new and separate rule of
constitutional criminal procedure. This question could go either way—as
evidenced by conflicting federal district court rulings on the subject—but
the majority opinion in Padilla does explicitly state that it is applying
Strickland rather than ignoring Strickland and creating a separate rule.62
While it is unlikely that all of the federal circuits (to say nothing of the
district courts) will agree on the issue of retroactivity, some states and
federal districts will presumably apply Padilla retroactively.
III. EXTENDING PADILLA
There are two primary ways of looking at deportation as a collateral
consequence, and courts’ selection among these two views will determine
the breadth of the Padilla rule in the coming years. These two views can be
seen in the majority and dissent in Padilla. The majority assumes that
immigration consequences are unique,63 while the dissent argues that
deportation is merely one of many similar collateral consequences.64
In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens took the position that
deportation is fundamentally different from other collateral consequences.
Over fifty years ago, the Court described deportation as “the equivalent of
banishment or exile.”65 The Padilla majority echoed this, noting the
“seriousness of deportation” and its “concomitant impact . . . on families
living lawfully in this country.”66 In fact, the Padilla Court wrote that “as a
matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”67 By describing
deportation as “integral” to the sentencing process, the Court attempted to
differentiate deportation from other consequences that are collateral to the
plea itself. If, as the majority suggests, deportation is unique, and uniquely
serious, as a collateral consequence, the logic in Padilla ought not extend to
other consequences.
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Padilla took the opposite view. He warned
that there was “no logical stopping-point” that would limit the majority’s
holding to deportation.68 Justice Scalia argued that there is no logical
difference between immigration consequences of a guilty plea and other

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
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Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (“Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.”).
Id. at 1486.
Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947).
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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collateral consequences. If deportation cannot be distinguished from other
collateral consequences on the basis of its relative seriousness or severity,69
or its relatedness to the penalties imposed by a criminal sentence, it will be
difficult for courts to limit Padilla to the context in which it was decided.
Extension of Padilla is no longer speculative—it has already occurred.
The following subparts first discuss some collateral consequences that may
tempt courts to extend Padilla and then analyze the first federal appellate
case to extend the requirement of Padilla warnings to a non-immigration
collateral consequence.
A. Other Collateral Consequences70

Relatively few of the possible detrimental effects of a guilty plea are
actually considered “direct” consequences.71 Direct consequences are those
that have a “definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range
of punishment.”72 Collateral consequences, on the other hand, are those that
are not direct consequences—they are not definite, immediate, and
automatic.73 Consequences are collateral, rather than direct, when they have
“no effect whatsoever upon the length or nature” of the actual criminal
sentence.74 If a judge can impose a penalty for a guilty plea but doing so is
discretionary, the penalty is collateral.75 Similarly, a consequence is
generally collateral if its imposition is contingent upon action by a
governmental agency or another actor outside the control of the sentencing
judge.76 These are only some of the definitions or categories of collateral
69
As both the concurrence and the dissent point out, guilty pleas can come with a variety of
consequences that are collateral rather than direct, and many such consequences would be as severe as
deportation. See id. at 1487–88 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70
The categorization of the consequences of guilty pleas as direct or collateral is relevant to two
different inquiries: (1) Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause issues presented by the
question whether a criminal defendant pleaded guilty “voluntarily” and (2) Sixth Amendment issues like
those presented in Padilla relating to effective assistance of counsel. Because the definitions of “direct”
and “collateral” consequences are consistent across these two areas, due process cases dealing with
collateral-consequence issues are often cited in this Part.
71
See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV.
670, 672 (2008) (explaining that only prison, fines, and other criminal punishments imposed by the
sentencing judge are considered direct consequences).
72
21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 620 (2008); see also United States v. Kikuyama, 109 F.3d 536,
537 (9th Cir. 1997) (giving the same definition of direct consequences); United States v. U.S. Currency
in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 915–16 (2d Cir. 1990) (same).
73
For a more in-depth critique of circuit courts’ varying and arguably vague definitions of collateral
versus direct consequences, see Roberts, supra note 71, at 689–93.
74
United States v. Long, 852 F.2d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Ray, 828 F.2d
399, 418 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)).
75
See, e.g., Kikuyama, 109 F.3d at 537 (“[T]he consequence is ‘collateral’ where it lies within the
discretion of the court to impose it.” (citing United States v. Wills, 881 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1989))).
76
See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 620 (2008 & Supp. 2011); see also United States v.
Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]here the consequence is contingent upon action taken
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consequences, and there is, as might be expected, variance in definitions
across circuits.77 The variance across circuits is not of tremendous
importance here, and for the purposes of this Note it suffices to summarize
collateral consequences as those that are unrelated to the actual penalties
imposed at sentencing, are imposed at the discretion of the sentencing
judge, or are outside of that judge’s control.
Certain collateral consequences, particularly those that are of similar
“seriousness” to the immigration consequences addressed in Padilla, bear
specific enumeration and discussion here.78
Perhaps the single most pernicious potential consequence of a guilty
plea that courts consider collateral is civil confinement. Certain categories
of crimes can subject individuals who commit them to indefinite civil
confinement at the conclusion of a prison sentence.79 Even though civil
confinement essentially amounts to additional prison time for a conviction
for which a sentence was already imposed and served, courts consider civil
confinement collateral to the plea.80 Based on the reasoning that the
statutory procedures for imposing civil confinement involve a number of
steps and independent actors’ determinations that do not “directly” follow
from a guilty plea, courts have held such confinement to be collateral even
where the criminal would be confined for life.81
Another collateral consequence is disenfranchisement. Historically, the
right to vote has been considered one of the most important rights possessed
by American citizens. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right
to vote is a “precious” and “fundamental” right82 because it is “preservative
of all rights.”83 However, states can nevertheless prohibit their citizens from
voting based on criminal convictions. When they do so following a guilty
plea, the disenfranchisement is a collateral consequence of the plea.84

by an individual or individuals other th[a]n the sentencing court—such as another governmental agency
or the defendant himself—the consequence is generally ‘collateral.’” (quoting Kikuyama, 109 F.3d at
537)).
77
See Roberts, supra note 71, at 689–93.
78
All of the circuit court decisions cited in this section were, as may be obvious, decided before
Padilla.
79
For instance, a “sexually dangerous person” can be civilly committed past the end of a prison
sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006); see also United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954
(2010) (sustaining such civil commitment against a constitutional challenge and noting the existence of
similar state civil commitment laws).
80
See, e.g., George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110–11 (8th Cir. 1984); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst.,
475 F.2d 1364, 1365–66 (4th Cir. 1973).
81
See, e.g., Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2004).
82
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
83
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
84
Waddy v. Davis, 445 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1971) (referring to disenfranchisement as “an indirect or
collateral consequence”).
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Even the possibility of imposition of additional criminal liability for
the same act or event is considered a collateral consequence. Where an
individual pleads guilty in state court, for instance, the possibility that a
federal prosecutor will subsequently press federal charges for the acts and
events underlying the state plea is collateral.85 Thus, in United States v.
Ayala,86 a criminal defendant was not permitted to withdraw a guilty plea
entered in state court where he had been informed neither by the trial court
nor by his attorney that it was possible that the federal government would
use the plea and its underlying facts to initiate a federal criminal
prosecution against him.87 The federal charges were considered collateral
even though the state plea would be used as evidence against the defendant
in the separate federal proceeding.88
Numerous other consequences of guilty pleas are “serious,” and are
potentially life changing, but are nevertheless considered collateral. Civil
forfeiture, for instance, is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea.89 So too
is the loss of certain public benefits.90 Government benefits that can become
unavailable due to a criminal conviction include welfare benefits such as
food stamps or coverage under the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families Act, federal student loans, and even the availability of public
housing.91 Courts have considered the loss of such federal benefits a
collateral consequence.92 Similarly, the loss of the ability to obtain a
driver’s license93 or passport94 due to a guilty plea has been ruled a collateral
consequence.

85

See, e.g., United States v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the use of a
state court guilty plea in a federal court proceeding was collateral to the plea).
86
601 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2010).
87
Id. at 270.
88
Id.
89
See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 916 (2d
Cir. 1990) (holding that civil forfeiture was collateral because the defendant’s “criminal conviction was
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition precedent to forfeiture of the currency” and the plea did
not “cause” the forfeiture).
90
See generally Alicia Werning Truman, Note, Unexpected Evictions: Why Drug Offenders Should
Be Warned Others Could Lose Public Housing If They Plead Guilty, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1753 (2004)
(discussing the variety of public-benefits-related collateral consequences to guilty pleas).
91
Id. at 1756–58; see also 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2006) (providing for the denial of federal benefits to
persons convicted of drug crimes).
92
See, e.g., United States v. Morse, 36 F.3d 1070, 1072 (11th Cir. 1994). But see United States v.
Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the loss of federal benefits after a guilty
plea was a direct consequence because it was an automatic result of conviction).
93
See Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1988).
94
See Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379, 380–81 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
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B. The First Extension of Padilla

The list of collateral consequences of pleading guilty to a crime is a
long one. Many of the consequences discussed above are of comparable
seriousness to deportation. However, the mere existence of collateral
consequences to which Padilla could plausibly be extended will not
automatically beget extension. If Padilla is to be extended, individual
courts must do the legwork that the majority’s opinion did not, and must
make the “logical” leap Justice Scalia’s dissent predicted they would,95 by
reading Padilla’s holding broadly enough to reach past immigration. Thus
far, only one circuit court has made this leap: the Eleventh Circuit explained
the central holding of Padilla as if it applied to collateral consequences in
general.96 Such a reading, if adopted in other circuits, would surely open the
floodgates that the Padilla majority argued were of no concern.97
The facts of the Eleventh Circuit case are similar to those of Padilla. In
2002, Gary William Bauder was charged with aggravated stalking of a
minor in violation of Florida state law.98 He and his lawyer began plea
negotiations, which ended in an agreement to a no-contest plea, in exchange
for which Bauder would serve nine months in prison, one year of
“community control,” and five years of probation.99 In 2006, following his
release from prison, Bauder admitted to violations of the terms of his
community control, for which he was placed back in prison in December of
that year.100 The day before his scheduled release from prison, the state of
Florida successfully petitioned to have Bauder declared a “sexually violent
predator.”101 As a result of that petition, Bauder was involuntarily civilly
committed beginning at the conclusion of his prison term; Bauder was still
committed as of the writing of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in September
2010.102
Bauder filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district
court in Florida, challenging his civil confinement. In his petition, he
alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
attorney had affirmatively misadvised him with regard to the possibility of

95

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[T]he
Supreme Court has noted that when the law is unclear a criminal defense attorney must advise his client
that the ‘pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse [collateral] consequences.’” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483)).
97
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484–85.
98
Bauder, 619 F.3d at 1273.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 1273 n.2.
101
Id.
102
Id.
96
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civil commitment.103 The district court granted the petition, finding that
Bauder’s attorney misadvised him and holding that the misadvice
constituted deficient performance and prejudiced him, thus satisfying both
parts of the Strickland test.104 On appeal, the state of Florida argued that
Bauder’s attorney had not rendered ineffective assistance because it was not
clear whether the collateral consequence of civil commitment would be
imposed on Bauder.105 The court rejected this argument and cited Padilla
for the proposition that where it is unclear whether a consequence will be
imposed on a criminal defendant, the attorney must warn his client of the
possible imposition of collateral consequences.106 As a result, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.
The facts of Bauder were fairly similar to those of Padilla (both
defendants were subjected to a collateral consequence due to a guilty plea
and both received affirmative misadvice from counsel about the possible
imposition of the consequence), but Bauder suffered a different collateral
consequence. The Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Bauder differed from
Padilla in that the court seemed to rely upon counsel’s misadvice, rather
than counsel’s failure to warn.107 However, the Eleventh Circuit
nevertheless cited Padilla as broadly requiring that “a criminal defense
attorney must advise his client” that the plea may carry a risk of collateral
consequences.108 The Bauder court’s restatement of Padilla, replacing
“deportation consequences” with the much broader “collateral
consequences,” extends Padilla to its outer limit—a requirement of Padilla
warnings for all criminal defendants about all collateral consequences.
It remains to be seen whether other circuits will apply the Bauder
court’s reading of Padilla. However, Bauder makes clear that an extension,
to some or even all collateral consequences of guilty pleas, is quite
plausible.

103

Id. at 1274. The attorney apparently said to Bauder, both before and after the plea bargain was
reached, that he “never believed that the facts [of Bauder’s case] would be sufficient to trigger a [civil
commitment] proceeding.” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation mark omitted). The Court
repeatedly referred to these statements as “misadvice,” but it is not clear that statements to this effect are
necessarily misadvice; in fact, that statement could arguably have provided notice to Bauder that such a
proceeding was a possibility. See id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 1274–75.
106
Id. at 1275.
107
See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484.
108
Bauder, 619 F.3d at 1275 (emphasis added).
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IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH PADILLA WARNINGS
A. Floodgates

The opinion for the Court in Padilla attempted to address the
“floodgates concerns”—voiced by the respondent and by amici including
the United States Government—that the Court’s holding would create a
flood of new ineffective assistance claims.109 The majority wrote:
We have given serious consideration to the concerns that the Solicitor
General, respondent, and amici have stressed regarding the importance of
protecting the finality of convictions obtained through guilty pleas. We
confronted a similar “floodgates” concern in Hill but nevertheless applied
Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the client regarding his
parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty.
A flood did not follow in that decision’s wake.110

The majority argued that even insofar as its holding increases the ease
with which criminal defendants who pleaded guilty can show deficient
performance of counsel, the prejudice prong of Strickland presents a “high
bar” to prospective claimants.111 Furthermore, the Court continued, for at
least the preceding fifteen years, “professional norms have generally
imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation
consequences of a client’s plea.”112 Thus, the Court predicted that lower
courts would be able to “effectively and efficiently use [Strickland’s]
framework to separate specious claims from those with substantial merit.”113
Even if this argument validly dispatches with the floodgates concerns it
purports to answer,114 the Court is addressing the wrong flood.
The Court’s answer to the floodgates concerns of the respondent
presumes that the flood of ineffective assistance claims would come only
from those defendants who were subject to deportation, and the Court
dismisses that category as being made up of defendants who (1) will
already have received notification and (2) will have difficulty overcoming
Strickland’s requirement of prejudice. However, the respondent’s brief
expresses a different and broader concern. The office of the Kentucky
Attorney General, in its brief to the Court, argued that finding Padilla’s
counsel ineffective would create a flood of ineffective assistance claims
from persons who suffered from any collateral consequence as a result of
109

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484–85.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
111
Id. at 1485.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
It is not actually clear that the ability of lower courts to distinguish among specious and
meritorious claims will prevent a flood. The concern is not, or ought not be, the possibility of a flood of
meritorious ineffective assistance claims, but rather the possibility of a flood of claims the merits of
which lower courts will be forced to devote time to deciding.
110
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pleading guilty.115 The argument that defendants will, by and large, already
have been apprised of the possibility of deportation is not responsive to the
broader concerns that the respondent and amici voiced.116 In all likelihood,
courts can expect a flood of litigation from criminal defendants who
suffered a variety of collateral consequences as a result of a guilty plea.
This flood will impose a significant burden on lower federal courts.
That burden may be further exacerbated by the possibility that Padilla
will be applied retroactively.117 The retroactivity of Padilla is limited, as a
practical matter, because of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA),118 which imposes a one-year statute of limitations on
habeas petitions.119 However, that statute of limitations, which typically
begins to run upon entry of a final judgment, can be extended by Supreme
Court recognition of a new right that is applied retroactively.120
Even though it is limited by the short statutory period in AEDPA, the
retroactive application of Padilla could increase the number of criminal
defendants with colorable habeas claims. Any defendant entitled to such a
claim who was convicted at any point would have one year to file a
petition. And, regardless of AEDPA, any defendant whose direct appeal has
not been completed would be entitled to assert a newly discovered
ineffective assistance claim in a direct appeal or as a collateral challenge.
Thus, the statute of limitations imposed by AEDPA will not prevent a flood
of new ineffective assistance claims.
B. Expertise Requirement

Criminal defense attorneys will pay a price as well if Padilla warnings
for all collateral consequences become constitutionally required.121 Criminal
115

Brief of Respondent at 35–36, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2473880, at
*35–36 (“The relative importance of a collateral consequence to a particular defendant does not create a
constitutional right. To do so would open the floodgates wherein pleas are challenged based on incorrect
advice regarding any and all types of consequences collateral to a valid plea.”).
116
Note that Solicitor General (now Justice) Kagan’s amicus brief expressed a concern of similar
breadth (not limited to the single collateral consequence of deportation) to that expressed by the
commonwealth of Kentucky. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at
17–18, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2509223, at *17–18.
117
See supra Part II.C.
118
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
119
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006) (statute of limitations for habeas petitions by persons in
custody pursuant to a judgment of state court); § 2255(f) (statute of limitations for habeas petitions by
persons in custody pursuant to a judgment of federal court).
120
See § 2255(f)(1), (3).
121
Even if Padilla is not extended to reach other collateral consequences, criminal attorneys will
face new and probably onerous expertise requirements, a concern that Justice Alito expressed in his
concurrence:
[T]he collateral-consequences rule expresses an important truth: Criminal defense attorneys have
expertise regarding the conduct of criminal proceedings. They are not expected to possess—and

367

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

defense attorneys are expected to have expertise in their field—criminal law
and trial practice. Defense attorneys may not, however, be experts in all of
the other areas of law that can be implicated when a client pleads guilty.
Defense attorneys are not necessarily experts in immigration law (though
their clients may be subject to removal); civil procedure and trial practice
(though their clients may be subject to forfeiture of assets or other forms of
civil liability after a plea); civil rights law (though their clients may
collaterally be deprived of constitutional rights, such as voting rights and
Second Amendment rights); family law (though criminal convictions may
beget collateral issues relating to adoption and parental rights); and so on.122
However, if courts begin to require defense attorneys to provide Padilla
warnings about any collateral consequence of pleading guilty, expertise in
all of these areas and many more will become obligatory. Defense attorneys
will risk findings by courts that they provided ineffective assistance if they
do not adequately apprise their clients of the entire constellation of
collateral consequences that may result from a guilty plea.
Imposing such a broad requirement of expertise—in areas in which
criminal defense attorneys have no preexisting reason to be expert—is not
in keeping with the first part of the Strickland test. In order to prevail in the
first part of the Strickland test, a convicted defendant must demonstrate that
his attorney was deficient—that the attorney’s advice was not “within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”123 This
range of competence presumably does not include the ability to offer
competent and knowledgeable legal advice in every area of law in which
collateral consequences exist. The very reason there are tax lawyers,
immigration lawyers, and criminal lawyers is that these areas of the law all
require career-long specialization in order to amass expertise. By imposing
an expertise requirement in an area of legal specialization outside the
criminal defense attorney’s own, the Padilla Court was either disregarding
the “range of competence” language from multiple effective assistance
cases,124 or was drastically expanding the range in which attorneys are
expected to be competent. Neither of these possibilities bodes well for
defense attorneys in the future.
Furthermore, this is not a burden defense attorneys are necessarily best
situated to bear. By deciding Padilla under the rubric of the Sixth
Amendment, the Court placed the onus on defense lawyers, putting them in
very often do not possess—expertise in other areas of the law, and it is unrealistic to expect them
to provide expert advice on matters that lie outside their area of training and experience.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487–88 (Alito, J., concurring).
122
See supra Part III.A.
123
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
124
In a literal sense the Court was disregarding this language—the Court never mentioned
“competence,” even though both the concurrence and the dissent did. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487–88
(Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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jeopardy of being found ineffective if they fail to provide adequate Padilla
warnings. However, even if criminal defendants must be informed of the
collateral consequences of a plea, defense attorneys may not be ideally
positioned to provide that information.
Criminal defense attorneys are specialists, and as such they would have
to acquire new, additional expertise in order to dispense adequate Padilla
warnings.125 Other actors involved in the guilty plea process are potentially
better suited to inform criminal defendants of the collateral consequences of
a plea. Prosecutors, for instance, might have expertise in a wider variety of
areas of law that collateral consequences implicate.126 Moreover, in pleabargaining situations, which is to say the vast majority of criminal cases,
the prosecutor plays an administrative, perhaps quasi-judicial role.127 As
now-Circuit Judge Gerard Lynch notes, in this role, the prosecutor often
makes nonnegotiable plea offers based on his own perceptions of the case
and his desired policy goals.128 Thus, even if Padilla warnings serve a
desirable function, they might be better coming from prosecutors (who by
virtue of fully looking into the collateral consequences of a plea deal might
alter the calculus before making a nonnegotiable offer) than from defense
attorneys.
Judges might also be in a better position than criminal defense
attorneys to inform criminal defendants of the collateral consequences of a
plea. Judges are likely to be more knowledgeable about a broader crosssection of the law than defense attorneys. Thus, judges would experience
lower costs than defense attorneys in gathering the information necessary to
provide Padilla warnings. Additionally, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure already provide a process in which judges advise and question
defendants who choose to plead guilty.129 These Rule 11 colloquies are
already obligatory—the Supreme Court has held that defendants are entitled
to withdraw their plea if the sentencing federal district judge fails to fully
125
But see Chin & Holmes, supra note 21, at 738 (arguing that with just three questions a defense
attorney could accurately dispense advice about collateral consequences). The Chin and Holmes
argument does not rebut the claim that Padilla warnings would require additional expertise. The
questions they recommend would expose whether the client would be of the class of defendants subject
to collateral consequences but would not actually provide the attorney with sufficient information to
provide nuanced and expert legal advice.
126
As one example of this expanded expertise, the United States Attorney’s office in a given federal
district will, in addition to trying the federal criminal cases in that district, try immigration cases, civil
forfeiture cases, etc. For a list of the entire constellation of federal statutes to which the Criminal
Division of the United States Attorney’s office is assigned, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-4.000 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_
room/usam/title9/4mcrm.htm.
127
See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2129 (1988) (“The prosecutor, then, is making a determination of guilt or innocence (and . . . often
also one of the appropriate punishment).”).
128
Id. at 2130 & n.10.
129
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
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adhere to the Rule 11 procedure.130 Simply adding a discussion of collateral
consequences into the Rule 11 colloquy that is already required of judges
would provide the same benefits as Padilla warnings, but at a lower cost.131
C. Disclaimer Issues

Even if Padilla warnings could theoretically be beneficial, they may
not in practice effectively notify defendants of the collateral consequences
of guilty pleas. While the court system and criminal defense attorneys will
face some burden even if Padilla is not extended, a requirement of Padilla
warnings may, on balance, be a good thing for criminal defendants
themselves. Indeed, providing more information about the consequences of
pleading guilty is an admirable goal.132 Criminal defendants as a group are
presumably less knowledgeable and sophisticated than the state and federal
prosecutors on the other side of the table during plea negotiations, and
providing defendants with a full accounting of the ramifications of their
guilty pleas might lead to increased bargaining power and an increased
likelihood of actual voluntariness and informed consent. Warnings about
the possibility of collateral consequences would, at the very least, create
greater consistency across plea negotiations, since all defendants, and not
just some, would know about which collateral consequences they faced.133
But while Padilla creates some advantages for criminal defendants, those
advantages come with corresponding costs.
It is not yet clear how much Padilla will be extended, or how Padilla
and its extensions will be implemented. As of now, attorneys must
somehow notify their clients of the possible deportation consequences of a
plea. Future case law will undoubtedly provide further guidance as to the
extent of the warnings (i.e., whether Padilla warnings will have to be
tailored to a specific client or whether attorneys can simply say “just so you
know, all guilty pleas carry the risk of collateral consequences, deportation,
etc.”).134 Attorneys may begin to offer boilerplate Padilla warnings to their
clients so as to provide notice, at least constructively, and avoid claims of
ineffective assistance. The more general Padilla warnings get, and the more

130

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1969).
This option was available to the Court in Padilla, which could have decided the case under the
rubric of due process instead of assistance of counsel. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496 &
n.1 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132
See, e.g., Chin & Holmes, supra note 21, at 703 (arguing that as a result of failure to apprise
defendants of collateral consequences, “defendants may be misled into pleading g[u]ilty, which is
unjust”).
133
See id. (arguing that notifying criminal defendants of the collateral consequences of a plea
“would help achieve more consistent and fair results, in which the plea and sentence would be based
more on the facts and circumstances”).
134
Presumably future case law will also instruct attorneys as to how they have to give warnings,
whether written Padilla warnings are acceptable, and so on.
131
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extensive the list of collateral consequences requiring warnings becomes,
the less effective these warnings will be.
Padilla warnings that are ineffective will provide few or no benefits to
criminal defendants.135 The difficulties associated with fine print, form
contracts, and other documents containing warnings or agreements in legal
language are well documented.136 As Padilla warnings become more
widespread, they may be increasingly ignored or misunderstood. If this
occurs, and if warnings become incomprehensible form documents or long
disclaimers, Padilla will have been for naught, as the decision will have
imposed a burden on attorneys and courts without producing the benefit of
actual (as opposed to merely constructive) notice of collateral consequences
for defendants.137
V. LIMITING PADILLA
The difficulty that courts will face is neither the sheer number of
collateral consequences of guilty pleas nor the likely difficulty courts will
have in line drawing. Rather, the real concern is the existence of a select
few collateral consequences that are difficult to logically distinguish from
deportation—consequences like civil commitment, civil forfeiture,
disenfranchisement, and the loss of public benefits. These consequences—
and perhaps others—present unique problems in the context of Padilla. Just
as removal is often “automatic”138 and especially severe,139 so too are these
particular collateral consequences. The extension of Padilla to cover this
relatively small number of consequences is plausible, and perhaps even
likely.140 And as discussed above, these few consequences can apply to a
135
Concededly, this is only an issue if attorneys begin to provide general, disclaimer-like Padilla
warnings as a matter of course. If courts require attorneys to warn individual clients about whatever
collateral consequences may affect them personally, without including extraneous information, there
may not be any problem.
136
For example, Professor Todd Rakoff, in an article about contracts of adhesion, noted that a
variety of forms go unread even by very sophisticated individuals. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983). He wrote: “I have asked
many lawyers and law professors over the past few years whether they ever read various form
documents, such as their bank-card agreements; the great majority of even this highly sophisticated
sample do not.” Id. at 1179 n.22.
137
Of course, this result—procedural criminal protections becoming ineffective for some criminal
defendants—is one that the legal system has turned a blind eye to in other contexts. See, e.g., Morgan
Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 572 (2002) (noting that Miranda warnings are ineffective—that is, they provide
constructive but not actual notice—for the mentally retarded and others of below-average intelligence).
138
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
139
Id. at 1486.
140
If the only concerns courts had were logic and fairness, extension would be practically
obligatory. To create in noncitizen criminal defendants a right to know about the likelihood of
deportation (enforced by creating an obligation on defense counsel to inform), but to fail to do so with,
say, sexually predatory criminal defendants with regard to the likelihood of civil commitment, would be
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wide swath of the population of criminal defendants pleading guilty. Thus,
even with a “limited” extension of Padilla to the most severe or automatic
consequences, a large proportion of the 95% of criminal defendants whose
convictions result from guilty pleas would either have a new ground for a
habeas petition or direct appeal (if they were already convicted and Padilla
is found to be retroactive) or would become entitled to a Padilla warning
from their defense attorneys if negotiations are ongoing. Insofar as such an
extension is worth avoiding, there are a few different approaches by which
lower courts could effectively cabin Padilla.
A. Limit Padilla to Affirmative Misadvice

One way that courts interpreting Padilla could reduce its scope is by
limiting it to its specific facts.141 The facts in Padilla did not present the
Court with a defendant whose attorney had been silent on the issue of
deportation, so the majority opinion did not have to decide that attorneys
rendered constitutionally deficient performance if they remained silent on
that issue.142 Accordingly, courts could decline to extend Padilla to other
collateral consequences except where attorneys affirmatively misadvised
their clients.143 This strategy has the unique advantage of cabining Padilla to
avoid imposing the steep costs of an affirmative duty on defense counsel
while also holding defense attorneys to a higher standard than the one to
which they had previously been held.
This is arguably what the Eleventh Circuit did in Bauder.144 There, the
petitioner had been affirmatively misadvised about the possibility of civil
commitment, and the court used that affirmative misadvice as its
justification for affirming the lower court’s grant of habeas corpus.145 If
courts choose (or feel logically compelled) to extend Padilla to other
collateral consequences, they can do so in contexts similar to the one
unfair. Deportation may be “banishment or exile,” id. (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388,
391 (1947)), but deported individuals return to countries of which they are citizens and where they are at
liberty upon arrival. That fate is inarguably less severe than indefinite civil commitment, which for some
sex offenders turns any sentence into a lifetime of incarceration.
141
See supra Part II.A.
142
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484 (“Silence under these circumstances would be fundamentally at odds
with the critical obligation of counsel to advise the client of ‘the advantages and disadvantages of a plea
agreement.’” (quoting Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995))).
143
This is the result Justice Alito’s concurrence advocated. Id. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring).
144
I say “arguably” because of the ambiguity of the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Bauder. On one
hand, the Bauder court used language to the effect that attorneys “must advise.” Bauder v. Dep’t of
Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010). On the other hand, the court indicated that it was affirming
the lower court’s grant of habeas corpus specifically because Bauder’s attorney affirmatively misadvised
him. Id. It is highly likely that the Eleventh Circuit valued the distinction between affirmative misadvice
and silence, since a year before its decision was handed down it had heard Bauder’s case and remanded
because the court below had failed to distinguish between affirmative misadvice and silence. See Bauder
v. Dep’t of Corr., 333 F. App’x 422, 424 (11th Cir. 2009).
145
Bauder, 619 F.3d at 1275.
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presented in Bauder, in which the defendant received incorrect advice
rather than none at all.146
The Padilla majority argued that differentiating between silence and
misadvice would have the “absurd result[]” of incentivizing silence about
important matters by defense counsel.147 This result, however, is not so
absurd. In fact, most jurisdictions do distinguish between silence and
misadvice by considering only the latter to be ineffective assistance.148
Moreover, the Court sold attorneys short when it said that a holding limited
to misadvice would incentivize silence. On the contrary, such a holding
would have disincentivized giving incorrect advice. It is disappointing that
the Court seems to have based its holding on a fear that defense attorneys
would do only what was constitutionally required of them to avoid
ineffective assistance.
B. Limit Padilla to Deportation

A second way of reducing the reach of Padilla by declining to extend it
would be to simply subscribe to the Court’s argument that deportation is
“unique.”149 Lower federal courts could apply Padilla as written to require
criminal defense lawyers to warn their clients if they face deportation as a
result of a plea, but refuse to extend it to other collateral consequences.
Lower courts could rationalize this approach two different ways.150
First, the Padilla Court explained that professional norms already
suggested that attorneys should warn their clients that they may be
deported.151 Since Strickland requires objectively reasonable performance
that comports with professional norms,152 and since there is a professional
norm that dictates attorneys should warn their clients about immigration
consequences of plea agreements, failure to warn could be considered
146

Circuit courts, of course, do not select their cases like the Supreme Court does, but they could
distinguish nonaffirmative-misadvice situations from Padilla, or they could rule that affirmative
misadvice constitutes deficient performance under Strickland but silence does not.
147
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484.
148
See Roberts, supra note 21, at 125–26 (noting that most jurisdictions that have examined the
issue have concluded that affirmative misadvice about collateral consequences, but not silence, can force
courts to permit defendants to withdraw a guilty plea). Similarly, at least three circuit courts already had
a policy of finding ineffective assistance where defense counsel affirmatively misrepresented the
possibility of deportation. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1493 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing United States
v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015–17 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir.
2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1540–41 (11th Cir. 1985)). Padilla abrogated
all three circuit decisions.
149
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
150
These justifications gloss over the fact that Padilla cannot logically be confined to immigration
on the stated bases of the Supreme Court’s holding. They could nevertheless be employed by courts to
prevent extension.
151
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
152
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Prevailing norms of practice . . . are
guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.”).
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deficient under the first prong of the Strickland test.153 As long as lower
courts do not find that professional norms similarly require warnings about
other collateral consequences, Padilla can be limited to deportation simply
by application of Strickland.154
Second, courts could simply decline to treat deportation as a collateral
consequence altogether. The Padilla Court noted the difficulty in
categorizing deportation as either direct or collateral to a plea.155 Indeed,
deportation could be framed as a direct consequence of a guilty plea, since
it is “definite, immediate, and largely automatic.”156 Deportation may be
imposed, as a technical matter, in a separate civil proceeding. However, it
is, as a factual matter, a direct consequence of pleading guilty.157 By treating
immigration consequences as noncollateral, courts could limit Padilla to
deportation.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court majority that decided Padilla did so with the
difficulties that criminal defendants face in mind. In a world in which
prosecutors wield an enormous bargaining advantage during the plea
process, providing additional information to criminal defendants is an
admirable aim.
Unfortunately, this additional information comes at too high a cost and
with too much risk of extension to other collateral consequences. Even if
Padilla has an eventual logical stopping-point, that point comes after
extension to many other collateral consequences that are as serious as
deportation. Because of Padilla, we may soon live in a legal system in
which criminal defendants are not “effectively” assisted by counsel until
they are warned of the many collateral consequences that may be imposed
on them due to a guilty plea.

153

More accurately, failure to warn about immigration consequences was arguably deficient before
Padilla and is now per se deficient.
154
This approach is undermined by the fact that the ABA Standards that the Strickland Court
identified as a possible guide to professional norms “require defense lawyers to consider collateral
consequences of conviction” in counseling their clients about guilty pleas. Chin & Holmes, supra note
21, at 701; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999) (“[D]efense counsel should
determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possible
collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated plea.”).
155
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (“Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because
of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a
collateral consequence.”).
156
21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 620 (2008). The Court noted that deportation was “virtually
inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
157
See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (“Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a
removable offense . . . his removal is practically inevitable . . . .”).
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These Padilla warnings will ask a great deal of defense attorneys by
imposing significant expertise requirements on them. These warnings will
require a great deal of courts, particularly in the near term, in the form of
larger dockets. Padilla warnings could make defendants reluctant to plead
guilty to crimes, which has for many years been the mode of disposition for
almost all criminal cases.158
Even with all of these costs, it is not clear that Padilla will actually
benefit criminal defendants at all. Will criminal defendants decide to take
the risk of going to trial at a greater clip? The evidence against them is often
overwhelming, and going to trial to avoid now-warned-about collateral
consequences may cost them in the form of increased direct consequences
such as longer prison sentences. For that matter, Padilla could have no
effect at all. Jose Padilla himself was getting deported, plea agreement or
not. He was arrested with a significant amount of marijuana in his
possession, and he was going to be subject to essentially mandatory
removal whether he lost at trial or pleaded guilty.159 The Court’s new rule,
mandating warnings about deportation and providing ineffective assistance
claims for those who are not warned, allows Padilla to stay in the country
for a little longer as he continues to try his case, but that is all it does. For
countless defendants in similar situations, the Padilla decision and the
practically inevitable lower court decisions extending it will provide a new
cause of action, but not actual relief.
That said, Padilla need not be overturned. Courts should simply refrain
from extending it, and should opt instead to limit it to its specific facts. In
doing so, lower courts will avoid imposing significant costs on our legal
system for a questionable benefit.

158
159

See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477–78.
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